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Impacts of Soybean Imports on Indian
Processors, Farmers, and Consumers
Suresh Chand Persaud and Erik Dohlman
India is one of the world’s largest importers of vegetable oils in part because of
low domestic oilseed production, and tariff and nontariff barriers preventing
oilseed imports. Simulation results indicate that India could lower its barriers to
soybean imports without adversely affecting farmers, since imports are econom-
ically attractive to crushers even when subject to modest tariffs which sustain
pre-liberalization farm and wholesale prices. Soybean processors in India achieve
higher rates of capacity utilization and lower unit costs using imported oilseeds.
Moreover, it is possible to partially redistribute to consumers the sizable gains
processors experience by lowering the soybean oil tariff.
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Spurred by rapid income growth and sharp reductions in trade barriers in the mid-
1990s, India has emerged as one of the world’s largest importers of vegetable oils.
With relatively low per capita consumption of vegetable oils (approximately 10
kilograms per person per year, versus 33 kilograms for the United States), there is
potential for growth in consumption and imports. India is also a significant exporter
of soybean meal, in competition with South America and the United States, which
further underscores the value of investigating the underlying dynamics of the Indian
oilseed complex, as well as the role of Indian policy makers in influencing the
performance and competitiveness of the sector. Despite its importance, India’s
oilseed sector has received only limited recent coverage (e.g., Srinivasan, 2004;
Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes, 2003; Chaudhary, 1997; World Bank, 1997; Gulati,
Sharma, and Kohli, 1996; Gulati and Phansalkar, 1994; Chandvaria, 1991; Dey and
Banerjee, 1991; Narappanavar, 1989).
One distinctive feature of the Indian market is that although imports of vegetable
oils are sizable, India’s tariff and nontariff barriers to oilseed imports
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2  The cost data and information on the Indian crushing industry are based primarily on USDA/Economic Research
Service field research in India in 2004, conducted by Suresh Persaud and Maurice Landes.
prevent imports of raw materials, favoring farmers at the expense of vegetable oil
consumers and oilseed processors. Additionally, farm support policies favoring
competing crops tend to discourage domestic production of oilseeds, which are
grown predominantly for their oil, rather than meal, value. Low supplies of domes-
tically produced oilseeds, which underlie India’s substantial imports of vegetable
oils, also limit capacity utilization rates among India’s generally small-scale pro-
cessors to roughly 30S40% (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes, 2003). The result is
relatively high crushing costs, which are covered by domestic oil prices that are
substantially above world prices, clearly at the expense of consumers.
The objective of this study is to develop alternate policy scenarios to examine the
impacts of soybean trade liberalization on crushing efficiency and oil imports. This
analysis uses an open economy structural representation of the Indian soybean sector,
including equations for soybean acres planted, the domestic usage of soy oil and soy
meal, and the cost of crushing.
2 The soybean sector is important because soy oil is
the most heavily imported oil for which India also has a substantial domestic produc-
tion base, which it seeks to protect from foreign competition through restrictive
policies on imports of oilseeds and oils.
A key result is that soybean imports need not occur at the expense of farmers since
imports are still economically attractive even when modest tariffs and/or transport
costs raise the landed (tariff-inclusive) import price above the autarchy level.
Crushers benefit because they use imported oilseeds to expand their sales volumes
of oil and meal, leading to increases in revenues and capacity utilization, lower unit
crushing costs, and lower imports of soy oil. Moreover, it is possible to partially
redistribute to consumers the sizable gains processors experience by lowering the
soybean oil tariff. Crushers earn less per unit of soybeans processed, but they are
still better off because they make it up on volume as revenue rises with expanding
sales. Thus, it is possible to develop a policy package allowing the Indian soybean
sector to emerge as a high-volume, low-margin business, where adjustments to the
oilseed and oil tariffs is a key mechanism for redistributing to farmers and consumers
the gains from permitting oilseed imports.
The following section of this study provides an overview of the structural char-
acteristics of the Indian oilseed processing sector. The simulation model is then
presented, and incorporates the soybean processing sector, the farm supply of soy-
beans, and the domestic demands for soy meal and soy oil. We examine potential
impacts of liberalizing soybean imports under various policy scenarios, and in
particular, we show that improved access to oilseed imports can compensate Indian
crushers for reduced duties on soy oil imports, while leaving farmers and consumers
as well or better off. Concluding remarks are offered in the final section.Persaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   173
The Indian Oilseed Processing Sector
India’s oilseed processing/crushing sector, which is currently fragmented and small
scale, operates at low rates of capacity utilization due to policy distortions and poor
infrastructure. Excess oilseed processing capacity is related to tax and other
incentives that stimulated over-investment in many rural areas, coupled with tariff
and phytosanitary barriers that prevent oilseed imports. Ghanis (traditional, very
small-scale processors) and small-scale expellers usually operate at just 10S30% of
capacity (World Bank, 1997), and even the more modern solvent extractor industry,
comprised of approximately 600 plants, typically uses less than 40% of capacity on
average (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes, 2003). This contrasts with the 92S96%
utilization rates reported for U.S. plants (Reca, 2003). According to the World Bank
(1997), low capacity utilization for solvent extractors has resulted in per unit soy-
bean processing costs in India which are 40% higher than in China and 90% greater
than in the United States.
However, there are a small number of Indian firms, as well as multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) that operate at higher plant utilization rates. Their financial
resources and lower borrowing costs give advantages at procuring and then storing
the raw material (oilseeds), leading to higher utilization rates and further cost
advantages. Tariff-hopping also appears to be a determinant of such foreign direct
investment flows in oilseed crushing, as India maintains substantial tariffs on
imports of edible oils. MNCs can choose either to export the soy oil to India (subject
to the 45% duty), or they can acquire existing underutilized plants in India and pro-
duce and sell the oil within the country, thereby avoiding the oil tariff. In the latter
approach, MNCs tend to acquire existing small-scale plants rather than construct
large-scale crushing units, which is perhaps indicative of substantial advantages
from operating close to full capacity, as well as a lower optimal plant size in India
stemming from infrastructure limitations. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen
whether foreign direct investment (FDI) in oilseed crushing will substitute for
exports of edible oils to India in a substantial way.
One factor preventing the rationalization and consolidation of the crushing sector
to a smaller number of more efficient, medium-sized plants is India’s small-scale
industry (SSI) reservation policies. The SSI policies confine processing of traditional
oilseeds—such as peanuts, rapeseed, sesame, and safflower, but not soybean and
sunflower—to small firms, thus allocating a large share of edible oil production to
relatively inefficient producers. However, more recent exposure to competition from
vegetable oil imports is pressuring small and less efficient processing units to mod-
ernize or close. Although SSI policies remain in place, efficiency gains are occurring
due to the growing share of domestic production by modern solvent extractors.
In addition to policy factors, poor infrastructure and low farm yields are key
factors inhibiting the rapid development of a large-scale industry. Although larger
plants could achieve size economies and lower crushing costs, these efficiency
benefits tend to be outweighed by higher procurement costs. Large-scale processors
would have to procure and transport oilseeds over a large land area since farm yields174   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
3  Additional information on the equation structure and model specification is available from the authors upon
request.
are low, thus placing greater demands on India’s poor infrastructure. Hence, the
elimination of India’s SSI policies is not in itself likely to lead to a large-scale
crushing industry on par with other countries. This is evidenced by the fact that even
Indian processors not covered by SSI policies—such as soybean processors and
solvent extractors—remain small by international standards, and that MNCs tend to
acquire existing small-scale plants rather than building large units. Although some
Indian soybean processors have a capacity of about 1,500 metric tons (mt) per day,
most plants have a capacity in the range of 170 mt per day. In comparison, the
average crushing capacity of the five newest U.S. plants is 100,000 bushels (2,700
mt) per day, slightly below the capacity of Brazil’s newest plants. Argentine plants
that came on line during 1995S97 are substantially larger, with the capacity to
process 165,000 bushels (4,455 mt) per day (Reca, 2003).
Barring any changes to policy, it appears likely that any further efficiency gains
would require fundamental longer-term changes leading to higher oilseed yields and
production, industry consolidation to eliminate excess capacity, and improved
transport infrastructure. However, perhaps the most immediate and important solu-
tion would be less restrictive policies on the import of oilseeds to augment domestic
supplies. The increased availability of oilseeds would allow processing plants in
coastal regions to operate at a higher level of capacity utilization using imported
oilseeds. Plants located in the interior could increase capacity utilization using
domestically produced oilseeds.
Processors gain from oilseed trade liberalization in two key ways: their unit costs
fall as they move down their cost curves and their sales volumes increase.
Processors’ profits would tend to increase sharply, and these benefits from liberal-
izing imports of raw materials can be partially transferred to consumers by lowering
the tariff on soybean oil. Subsequent sections of this study investigate possible
impacts on processors, consumers, and farmers of permitting imports of the raw
material (oilseeds), using a structural model of India’s soybean complex.
Oilseed Model Characteristics
In addition to oilseed trade policies and structural characteristics of the crushing
industry, key variables affecting the Indian oilseed complex include growth in
income, crop area, farm yields, and world prices of oils and meals. We develop
projections through the year 2010 using a structural model to examine the likely
impacts of these key variables on India’s projected consumption, production, and
imports of soybean oil, as well as India’s production, domestic usage, and exports
of soy meal. This section describes the components of the model,
3 beginning with
the cost of crushing. This serves as the basis for the reference and policy scenario
results outlined in the next section.Persaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   175
Cost of Crushing
Based on field research, the World Bank (1997) demonstrates that higher capacity
utilization in softseed and soybean crushing can improve India’s international cost
competitiveness. Using crush costs in the U.S. as the benchmark, the relative costs
of crushing in India at different levels of capacity utilization are specified. For
example, as capacity utilization in India’s soybean crushing plants increases from
25% to 30% to 50%, India’s disadvantage in costs is diminished, but not eliminated.
For the softseed category, India approaches the U.S. standard at 66% utilization,
with costs only 1% above those in the United States.
The World Bank (1997) is remarkably thorough in its coverage of the Indian
oilseeds complex. However, although its information on relative costs is valuable,
it is not directly applicable to the current study, which requires actual costs rather
than data based on an index. The current study also requires information on the
behavior of soybean crushing costs over a wider range of capacity utilization
levels, beyond 50%. It is unlikely that average costs attain a minimum at 50%
utilization, implying the three data points should be more widely spaced to more
completely reflect the curvature of the cost relationship. (A larger number of
data points, though also preferable, are difficult to obtain, particularly when relying
on field research.)
Consequently, we obtained cost data and information from individual firms and
industry representatives that are more tailored to the requirements of the current
study. Data were gathered during field research conducted as part of the USDA’s
Emerging Markets program for India. Operating costs in India reportedly fall by
almost half to 475 rupees per mt, when moving from 40% utilization to full capacity,
attaining a minimum at approximately 80% utilization.
The quadratic equation that fits the three data points is given by:
(1) CRcost1 ' CR
1
1 ×CapUtil1**2 % CR
2
1 ×CapUtil1 % CR
0
1
' 0.3363×CapUtil1**2 & 54.17×CapUtil1 % 2,528.7,
where CRcost1 is the average variable cost of crush, CapUtil1 is capacity utilization,
and “**2” indicates squared. Total crush costs (TCRcost1) are represented by:
(2)   TCRcost1 ' SCrush1× 0.3363×(SCrush1/Cap)**2
& 54.17×(SCrush1/Cap) % 2,528.7 % FC,
where SCrush1 is the quantity of soybean crush, FC is the fixed cost, and Cap is the
soybean crush capacity, such that capacity utilization (CapUtil1) is given by
SCrush1/Cap in (2).176   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 1. Indian Soybean Model Results
Variable Unit
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Source: India soybean simulation model.
a Scenario definitions are as follows: (zero, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero and
45%, respectively; (zero, 35) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero and 35%, respectively;
and (four, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are 4% and 45%, respectively.
Demand and Supply Elasticities
Existing literature does not provide formal estimates of income or own-price elasti-
cities of demand for soybean oil in India. Time-series price data provide relatively
few observations for econometric estimation. In a recent study, Kumar (1998)
estimated demand elasticities for “oil” as an aggregate commodity group, with
expenditure elasticities of 0.389 (rural) and 0.234 (urban), and own-price elasticities
of !0.567 (rural) and !0.522 (urban). However, given the relatively fast growth in
soy oil consumption, the current study uses 0.77743 and !0.5375 for the income and
own-price, respectively (table 1). These elasticities are in line with Dev et al.’s
(2004) estimates for the commodity group “edible oil”: 0.85 (rural) and 0.3662
(urban) for the expenditure elasticities, and !0.5698 (rural) and !0.3547 (urban) forPersaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   177
Table 1. Extended

























































































the own-price. The scenarios developed in the current study hold constant the prices
of substitutes and complements, such that demand is influenced only by changes in
own-price and income.
Just as in the case of soy oil, existing literature does not provide formal elasticity
estimates for India’s domestic usage of soy meal. Soy meal consumption is specified
as a function of the own-price and income. India’s domestic use of soy meal is
driven by poultry and egg production (Landes, Persaud, and Dyck, 2004). The
income elasticity of soy meal demand (1.78) used in the simulation model is com-
puted from the poultry and egg model developed in Landes, Persaud, and Dyck by
calculating the impact of a 1% gross domestic product (GDP) shock on soy meal
usage. The own-price elasticity (!0.12) was computed from a 1% shock to the whole-
sale price of soy meal. We hold constant the prices of substitutes and complements
in the projections.
The soybean area response elasticity from the USDA baseline (USDA/Office of
the Chief Economist, 2004) is 0.6, which is used as the long-run elasticity in the178   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
current study, while the short-run area response in the current study is 0.2. In this
analysis, yield grows at a trend rate of 1% per annum, and prices of competing crops
are held constant. Farm production of oilseeds is computed as the product of area
and yield. Note that the policy experiments hold constant the prices of competing
crops in the area equation.
Base Year Prices and Quantities
Due to the behavior of India’s monsoons as well as data limitations, the model uses
a base year of 2001. The year 2002 saw one of the worst monsoon seasons in more
than a decade, while 2003 was one of the best. This led to atypically poor agricul-
tural performance followed by a sharp improvement in the following year. Because
the most recently available data approximating a typical crop year are for 2001, this
year is better suited for the base. The model parameters replicate India’s domestic
prices and quantities in the base period. In the year 2001, India’s oil and meal
extraction rates, domestic supply, and uses for soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean
oil are computed from the USDA’s PS&D database [USDA/Foreign Agricultural
Service (FAS), 2004]. The domestic wholesale prices of soybeans and soy oil are for
Madhya Pradesh, published by the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture
(2003). The domestic price of soy meal is taken from the Solvent Extractors’
Association (SEA) of India (2003).
Projected Prices and Quantities
Through the projection period, India’s real domestic wholesale prices of soybean oil
are obtained from the vector of real world prices generated by the USDA baseline,
adjusted for tariffs and the estimated transport and marketing costs used to replicate
the base period. Because India does not impose taxes on soy meal exports, the
domestic soy meal prices are determined more simply by adjusting the real-world
prices from the USDA baseline by estimated transport and marketing costs. This
analysis employs the small country assumption, i.e., the quantity of India’s meal (oil)
exports (imports) do not affect the prices they receive (pay), implying the domestic
prices of meal and oil are exogenous. World prices for the oilseeds, the exchange
rate for the rupee, and the GDP deflators through 2010 are from USDA/FAS (2004).
The policy changes that occur in the alternate scenarios are enacted in 2005 and
maintained through the terminal year of the simulation exercise (2010).
Prospects for India’s Oilseed Sector: 
Projections Through 2010
The analysis begins with a “reference” scenario that projects the impacts on farmers,
processors, and consumers of maintaining 4% growth in per capita income, while
keeping in place current policies on imports of edible oils, as well as trade barriers
that prevent oilseed imports. This “business as usual” projection serves as a bench-Persaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   179
mark against which we investigate the impacts of eliminating nontariff barriers on
oilseeds, combined with reductions in tariff. Rather than making policy recom-
mendations or arguing for particular point estimates, the alternate policy scenarios
are designed to underscore key conclusions of our welfare analysis, while taking into
account that decision makers must often weigh competing interests of various stake-
holders in their food systems.
Reference Scenario (Oilseed Autarchy)
In the absence of soybean imports, oilseed crush is simply a residual equal to the
predetermined level of domestic oilseed production less the exogenous quantities of
seed, feed, waste, and food uses. The stock of crush capacity remains constant
throughout the projection period, implying that once the quantity of crush is known,
capacity utilization can be computed. We assume nonfarm input costs of crushing,
such as labor, hexane, and energy expenses, are constant in real terms (they grow at
the same rate as inflation). Thus, capacity utilization is the only variable that causes
the real cost of crushing to vary throughout the projection period. Given the level of
capacity utilization, the model computes the cost of crush. The autarchy wholesale
price of soybeans is formed by subtracting the cost of crushing from a weighted sum
of the oil and meal prices, where the weights are the oil and meal extraction rates.
The farm price of the oilseed is then computed by subtracting a margin from the
autarchy wholesale price of the oilseed. The farm price will determine the produc-
tion of oilseeds in the subsequent period.
In the reference scenario, real world prices of soybeans, soy oil, and soy meal
increase sharply through 2004, then decline steadily thereafter through 2010, as per
the USDA baseline projections. Although India does not import soybeans under the
reference scenario, the domestic price of soybeans rises along with the world price
of meal and the tariff-adjusted world price of oil, implying soybean production
(figure 1), which responds to lagged prices, exhibits strong growth through 2005
before leveling off. These initial gains in the production of soybeans are not suffi-
cient to offset decreasing soy oil imports (figure 2), leading to falling consumption
through 2004, followed by subsequent rapid growth in imports and consumption.
Consumption of soy oil increases by 16.1%, from 2.4 million metric tons (mmt) in
year 2001 to 2.8 mmt in 2010. India’s exports of soy meal peak at 3.1 mmt in year
2005 (figure 3) and decline steadily thereafter. By year 2010, soy meal exports are
barely above the base year (2001), as India’s consumption rises faster than domestic
production.
Although the stock of crush capacity remains constant, domestic production of
soybeans grows from 5.4 mmt in the base year to 7.1 mmt in the terminal year (table
1), allowing an improvement in capacity utilization from 40% to 53%. The analysis
holds constant the real prices of the nonmaterial inputs used in the crushing industry,
so that capacity utilization is the only variable influencing real crush costs. Thus,
real unit crush costs (exclusive of the raw material but including the fixed costs) fall
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Source: India soybean simulation model.
Note: Scenario definitions are as follows: (zero, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero
and 45%, respectively; (zero, 35) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero and 35%,
respectively; and (four, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are 4% and 45%, respectively.
Figure 1. Soybean production under the four scenarios
Source: India soybean simulation model.
Note: Scenario definitions are as follows: (zero, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero
and 45%, respectively; (zero, 35) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero and 35%,
respectively; and (four, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are 4% and 45%, respectively.
Figure 2. Soybean oil imports under the four scenariosPersaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   181
4  Moreover, because the wholesale price of soybeans moves in lockstep with world prices, improvements in
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ton in year 2010, or 31%. However, processors’ surplus per unit of production does
not change in real terms from its base year level of 1,119 rupees, since benefits of
cost reductions are passed on to farmers in the form of higher real oilseed prices.
Real domestic wholesale prices of oilseed grow faster than world prices. Although
crushers do not realize higher per unit surplus, they nevertheless benefit from higher
total surplus, due to increases in the volume of their sales. Thus, total processors’
surplus expands by the same amount as the quantity of crush, 31.7%.
Oilseed Import Scenario: Benefiting Farmers and 
Processors (zero, 45)
This policy experiment demonstrates that the removal of barriers to soybean imports
may confer sizable gains to processors. We denote this scenario as (zero, 45) in table
1, because we completely eliminate in year 2005 tariff and nontariff barriers to
imports of soybeans, while maintaining the soy oil duty of 45%. (Per capita income
grows at 4% per annum as before.) A key implication is that now India’s wholesale
price of soybeans is determined from the freight-adjusted world price,
4 and, with trans-
port costs of 1,880 rupees per mt, the wholesale price in 2010 (11,357 rupees) turns out
to be 3% greater than the autarchy price realized in the reference scenario (11,027
rupees). In effect, this policy experiment investigates whether processors’ willingness
to pay for oilseeds actually exceeds the autarchy prices from the reference.
Source: India soybean simulation model.
Note: Scenario definitions are as follows: (zero, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero
and 45%, respectively; (zero, 35) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are zero and 35%,
respectively; and (four, 45) indicates that tariffs on soybeans and soy oil are 4% and 45%, respectively.
Figure 3. Soy meal exports under the four scenarios182   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
When oilseed imports are permitted, the optimal crush quantity cannot be com-
puted as a residual, since optimal oilseed crush may exceed domestic production.
The optimizing framework computes the level of soybean crush to maximize pro-
cessors’ surplus, subject to the cost equation, and given the output and input prices:
(3)    Max
SCrush1
OEXT1×OPriceW1 % MEXT1×MPriceW1
& TCRcost1 & SPriceW1 ,
where OEXT1 is the soybean oil extraction rate, OPriceW1 is the domestic price of
soy oil, MEXT1 is the soybean meal extraction rate, MPriceW1 is the domestic price
of soy meal, and SPriceW1 is the domestic price of the raw material (soybeans).
Substituting (2) into (3) for the crush cost yields:
(4)   Max
SCrush1
OEXT1×OPriceW1 % MEXT1×MPriceW1 & SPriceW1
& SCrush1× 0.3363×(SCrush1/Cap)**2
& 54.17×(SCrush1/Cap) % 2,528.7 % FC .
Rather than solving explicitly for the crush demand, the optimization framework
used in this study iterates to compute the profit-maximizing quantity of oilseed crush.
A non-deterministic approach is preferable, since the cost curves are nonlinear, and
it is difficult to obtain closed-form solutions. Crush levels that exceed the predeter-
mined quantity of domestic production give rise to oilseed imports. Domestic oil,
meal, and oilseed prices, which are influenced by world prices, transport costs, and
tariff levels in the case of the oil and oilseed, will affect the profit-maximizing
quantity of oilseed crush. Additionally, the ratio of the tariffs on oils to oilseeds will
affect the crush and oilseed import decision. All other things equal, an increase in
the oil tariff relative to the oilseed tariff tends to favor oilseed imports. Similarly, the
ratio of the world prices of the outputs (oil and meal) to the world oilseed prices,
coupled with the ratio of the transport costs of oils to oilseeds, will influence the
oilseed import decision. This information is summarized in the crush margins that
prevail in the domestic market.
Beginning in year 2005, crushers are free to expand production to levels that are
substantially above those in the reference scenario, since their supplies of raw
materials are no longer constrained. Soybean imports occur, and unit-crushing costs
decrease at a faster rate than in the reference, due to stronger growth in capacity
utilization. Nevertheless, surplus per unit falls even with the observed decreases in
unit costs of crushing, because processors, who previously paid the autarchy price
for oilseeds, must now pay an even higher price for raw materials. Although pro-
cessors earn less per unit of output, they make it up on volume by greatly increasing
sales. Thus, total surplus in processing is higher than under the reference, despite
decreases in surplus per unit—a key result of sharply expanding production using
imported raw materials.Persaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   183
5  In year 2005, the 4% soybean duty has the same effect as increasing the real transport cost by approximately 423
rupees per mt.
Processors can afford to pay somewhat more for oilseeds if it allows them to
expand output. Therefore, oilseed trade liberalization is consistent with higher farm
prices of soybeans that can be enforced by setting and defending farm support prices
in line with the relatively high freight-adjusted world prices. The result would be a
constant margin between the wholesale price of soybeans (which is determined from
the freight-adjusted world price) and the farm price, whereby movements in farm
prices track wholesale prices. Consequently, farm prices and production are higher
than in the reference scenario. India’s domestic production of oil and meal exceed
the levels in the reference, as increased domestic production of soybeans is further
augmented by imports of soybeans.
When oilseed imports are permitted, India’s soy oil imports (figure 2) decrease
sharply in 2005 (the year in which the trade liberalization is implemented), in an
almost parallel downward shift, while soy meal exports rise sharply in 2005 (figure
3). During subsequent years, oil imports grow at roughly the same rate as under the
reference, and meal exports decline steadily. Thus, oilseed trade liberalization acts
as an intercept shifter. Note that the post-2005 growth in soy oil imports and the
decreases in soy meal exports are consequences of maintaining a fixed stock of crush
capacity throughout the projection period in the face of growing domestic demands
for soy oil and meal. The assumption of zero growth in crush capacity is not a
prediction or a forecast, but rather is part of the scenarios. Sensitivity analysis shows
that if crush capacity grows in line with the demand for oil after 2005, oil imports
stabilize at a low level.
Oilseed Import Scenario: Maximum Benefits to Farmers (four, 45)
The analysis of soybean imports is further developed by imposing a 4% duty on
soybean imports.
5 The 45% tariff on soy oil is maintained, while per capita income
continues to grow at 4% per annum. This scenario, which is denoted as (four, 45) in
table 1, illustrates the possibility of liberalizing soybean imports while at the same
time benefiting farmers with approximately neutral effects on processors. Processors
now pay even more for the raw material, and surplus per unit falls sharply. However,
total surplus is about the same level as in the reference scenario, implying that the
4% soybean duty has transferred almost all of the processors’ benefits from
improved access to raw materials to farmers. This policy package provides the
largest benefits for farmers without harming processors.
Oilseed Import Scenario: Benefiting Consumers, Farmers, and
Processors (zero, 35)
We now illustrate a consumer-oriented policy package that benefits all stake-
holders—consumers, farmers, and processors. This policy experiment is denoted as184   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
(zero, 35) in table 1, because we completely eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers
to imports of soybeans, while reducing the soy oil duty to 35%. Per capita income
grows at 4% per annum as before. In the terminal year of the projection period, the
domestic price of soy oil is 5.5% lower than under the reference scenario, while
consumption expands less than proportionately, i.e., by 3.3%. The extent to which
oil consumption increases in response to the reduced tariff is clearly a function of
the magnitude of the own-price elasticity, as confirmed by experiments with own-
price elasticities that are larger in absolute value. Although the reduction in the soy
oil tariff transfers to consumers almost all of the benefits of oilseed trade liberal-
ization, processors and farmers are still better off than in the reference, as indicated
by increases in farm prices and in total processor surplus.
Conclusions
India is a significant producer of oilseeds, but its demand for edible oils far outstrips
its current capacity to supply oil from domestic output. Nevertheless, market
developments in the sector are heavily influenced by domestic and trade policies, as
policy makers attempt to weigh competing priorities of different interest groups.
Indian policy makers have simultaneously attempted to protect consumers from food
price inflation, in part through increased imports of edible oils, while at the same
time protecting India’s sizable domestic production base of oilseeds from foreign
competition through fluctuating edible oil tariffs and policies that prevent whole
oilseed imports. By effectively prohibiting oilseed imports, the government of India
may have given up a measure of policy flexibility that could in fact balance the
interests of farmers, consumers, and processors to the advantage of all three groups.
Limited supplies of oilseeds constrain processors to operate at low rates of capacity
utilization, contributing to relatively high crushing costs and foregone sales and
profits.
Under several scenarios, we show the potential cost savings and associated gains
in processor surplus stemming from the ability to import soybeans and improve
utilization rates. We also demonstrate the means to distribute those gains by altering
the ratio of oil and oilseed tariffs. The gains in processors’ surplus may be suffici-
ently large to permit welfare-enhancing transfers to farmers and consumers while
still leaving processors the same or better off, where adjustments to the oilseed tariffs
is the mechanism for redistributing the gains from partial liberalization of India’s
oilseed trade.
Finally, a useful extension of this study involves investigating whether the United
States is likely to gain more from improved access to the Indian market for oilseeds
than for edible oils. Thus far, U.S. exports of soy oil to India have been limited by
competition from South America and the availability of low-priced palm oil from
Southeast Asia (Dohlman, Persaud, and Landes, 2003). However, if India were to
allow imports of oilseeds, not only would its crushing industry gain, but it may also
benefit the U.S., which tends to be more competitive at exporting soybeans than soyPersaud and Dohlman Impacts of Soybean Imports on the Indian Market   185
oil. Although the United States would still face considerable competition from South
American soybeans, oilseed trade liberalization would effectively reduce the
competitive threat faced by the U.S. from South American soy oil exports—India’s
imports of soybeans would substitute for its soy oil imports.
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